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european court oF  
human riGhtS 
European Court of Justice strikes 
down security Council Blacklist
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
ruled that the implementation of the United 
Nations Security Council’s Al-Qaida 
blacklist without access to an effective 
remedy violates human rights. In 1999, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1267, 
which requires all states to freeze assets 
and ban travel of individuals and entities 
associated with Al-Qaida or the Taliban. 
The European Union (EU) passed a series 
of regulations implementing the resolution 
and its subsequent amendments. The list 
of individuals and entities subject to the 
sanctions is created by the Al-Qaida and 
Taliban Sanctions Committee, comprised 
of representatives from each member of 
the Security Council. Because affected 
individuals have no standing to challenge 
who is put on or taken off the list, the ECJ 
held on September 3, 2008, in Kadi and 
Al Barakaat v. Council of the European 
Union that the EU regulations violated 
their fundamental rights to be heard, to 
respect for property, and to an effective 
remedy which form part of the EU law. 
The crucial issue before the court was 
whether the ECJ had the power to review 
the legality of EU regulations. The Court 
of First Instance, the judicial body from 
which Kadi appealed, held that the ECJ 
generally does not have this power. This 
is because EU regulations only  implement 
obligations arising from the UN Char-
ter, which by virtue of Article 103, has 
primacy over the law of the European 
Community. 
The ECJ approached this sensitive mat-
ter by carefully circumscribing its power 
of review to the conformity of the EU 
regulations with the legal order of the 
European Community. The ECJ stressed 
its inability to review the lawfulness of 
Security Council resolutions themselves. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ held that the fact 
that obligations were imposed by an inter-
national treaty “cannot have the effect of 
prejudicing the constitutional principles 
of the EC treaty, which include the prin-
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ciple that all Community acts must respect 
fundamental rights” and that “measures 
incompatible with respect for human rights 
are not acceptable in the Community.” The 
ECJ positioned the effects of international 
law in the legal order of the European 
Community below the “very foundations 
of the Community legal order, one of 
which is the protection of fundamental 
rights.” It thus implicitly refused to give 
Article 103 of the UN Charter an effect of 
overriding all conflicting rules. 
The Court must be hailed for giving 
precedence to the protection of human 
rights over any possible conflicting inter-
national obligations. It is hoped that the 
judgment will have an impact on the work 
of the Security Council, which should 
amend its procedures to be more respect-
ful of human rights. Otherwise, it runs the 
risk of undermining the effectiveness of 
its decisions in instances like Kadi, where 
states may be unwilling to fully implement 
such decisions due to conflicts with the 
protection of human rights.
Deporting severely Ill Violates 
Article 3 only in ‘Exceptional 
Circumstances’
In N. v the United Kingdom, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) upheld a decision to deport 
an asylum seeker with AIDS back to 
Uganda. Despite the unavailability of vital 
antiretroviral treatment in her home coun-
try, the removal of Ms. N. would not vio-
late Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (the Convention).
Ms. N. was diagnosed with AIDS shortly 
after arriving in the United Kingdom (UK) 
in 1998. Although Ms. N.’s condition 
was stabilized after intensive antiretroviral 
treatment, a 2001 expert report determined 
that without continuing regular treatment, 
her life expectancy would be less than one 
year. Ms. N. claimed that the acute physi-
cal and mental suffering, followed by an 
early death in Uganda due to the lack of 
adequate medical treatment, would violate 
Article 3’s prohibition against inhuman or 
degrading treatment.
On May 27, 2008, the court held that 
the removal of an alien with a serious 
mental or physical illness to a country with 
inferior treatment facilities may raise an 
issue under Article 3, but only in “a very 
exceptional case, where the humanitarian 
grounds against the removal are compel-
ling.” The criteria for an “exceptional 
case” are the severity of the illness, avail-
ability of the treatment, and the prospect 
for family and social support in the target 
country.
The Court did not find such excep-
tionality in the present case. Although it 
accepted that the applicant’s life and life 
expectancy would be adversely affected 
if she were returned to Uganda, the Court 
still found that she was not critically ill 
when the case was decided and that the 
lack of access to medical treatment and 
support in Uganda was speculative.
The Court should be hailed for rec-
ognizing the possibility that removal of 
a seriously ill alien might violate Article 
3; however, the Court’s application of 
the Article to this case was questionable. 
First, the Court was satisfied with the 
statement that antiretroviral medication 
is generally available in Uganda, but it 
did not consider whether the applicant 
herself would have access to it. Indeed, 
the three  dissenters pointed to the fact that 
the available  evidence clearly proved that 
Ms. N. would not have access. Second, 
the reliance of the Court on the fact that 
the applicant’s condition was stabilized is 
dubious and at odds with the case law. It is 
not the time proximity between deportation 
and the suffering that is decisive, but the 
foreseeability of the prohibited treatment 
as a consequence of the deportation.
Additional European Court of 
Human Rights Cases
In Vajnai v. Hungary the Court found 
that a criminal conviction for wearing 
a red star symbol violated the freedom of 
expression. The Court held that, because 
not all uses of the symbol connote com-
munist totalitarian rule, a flat ban on the 
symbol would be “too broad.” On the con-
trary, in Soulas v. France, the Court upheld 
criminal sanctions against the author of a 
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book that argued that Muslims were gradu-
ally overtaking Europe, stating that the 
book incited hatred and violence towards 
Muslim communities. 
In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands the 
Court explored the issue of internal flight 
alternative, a contested area of refugee 
law. The supporters of the concept argue 
that if persons are able to escape perse-
cution by moving into a different part of 
their country, they cannot claim refugee 
status abroad. The Court held that as a pre-
condition for relying on an internal flight 
alternative, certain guarantees have to be 
in place. “The person to be expelled must 
be able to travel to the area concerned, gain 
admittance and settle there, failing which 
an issue under Article 3 may arise.”
In Maslov v. Austria the Grand Chamber 
found that Article 8 prohibits an expulsion 
from the country of immigrant juvenile 
offenders because of effects on their fam-
ily life. It stressed that, for juveniles, “very 
serious reasons are required to justify 
expulsion.” Nevertheless, it was careful to 
leave the door open especially for cases of 
particularly violent offenders. 
In Budayeva v. Russia, the Court held 
that the positive obligations of states under 
the right to life in Article 2 extend also to 
situations of natural disasters. Thus, the 
Court found Russia responsible for deaths 
in a 2001 mudslide for failing to take mea-
sures against an imminent and identifiable 
natural hazard. Russia’s request for a refer-
ral to the Grand Chamber is still pending.
In Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey, the 
Grand Chamber ruled 13 to four that the 
extraordinarily high ten percent electoral 
threshold imposed in parliamentary elec-
tions in Turkey is excessive, but does not 
violate the right to free elections in the 
specific circumstances of the case. The 
primary mitigating circumstance was that 
individual candidates were not subject to 
the threshold and, in practice, strategies 
such as candidates running independently 
rather than on a party list of which they 
were members were successful in achiev-
ing seats in the Parliament. The dissenters 
severely criticized the Court for relying on 
informal ways around the threshold.
Ghosts of the past haunted the Court in 
Kononov v. Latvia and Korbely v. Hungary. 
Both Konovov, a member of Red Partisans 
during World War II, and Korbely, a mem-
ber of Hungarian communist army during 
the 1956 Hungary uprising, were convicted 
of killing civilians. In both cases, the Court 
found, by a close margin, a violation of 
Article 7 (no punishment without law) 
because the convictions could not be based 
either on domestic law or on the right inter-
pretation of international humanitarian law 
(IHL). The core of the judgments lies in 
the analysis of a status of a civilian under 
IHL. In Konovov, the Court held that men 
who received rifles and grenades from the 
German military administration and sided 
with them could not be regarded as civil-
ians under the laws and customs of war as 
codified in the Hague 1907 Regulations. In 
Korbely, the Grand Chamber found that the 
victim was a member of armed group of 
insurgents, carried a handgun secretly and 
did not signal in an unequivocal way an 
intention to surrender when caught. Thus 
the victim did not fall under any category 
of a protected person under the Common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 
Latvian government has already indicated 
a will to have the case reviewed by the 
Grand Chamber. 
inter-american SyStem
Haiti Violated Former  
Prime Minister’s Rights
The Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights (the Court) issued judgment in Yvon 
Neptune v. Haiti on May 6, 2008, mark-
ing its first decision on Haiti. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
(the Commission) submitted the case to 
the Court in December 2006 due to the 
failure of the Haitian government (Haiti) 
to respond to the recommendations of the 
Commission. The Court found that Haiti 
violated Neptune’s rights as protected 
by the American Convention on Human 
Rights, including judicial protections, per-
sonal liberty, and personal integrity. The 
Court, however, did not find a violation of 
Article 9 (freedom from retroactive laws). 
Neptune served as Haitian prime min-
ister amidst a political crisis that spanned 
March 2002 to March 2004 in the govern-
ment of former president Bértrand Aris-
tide. Following a February 2004 armed 
confrontation in the city of La Scierie 
(Saint-Marc) resulting in many deaths, the 
government fell and an interim government 
was established. Days before, Neptune vis-
ited La Scierie as prime minister and urged 
police forces to impose order in the city. 
Soon after the visit, the Saint-Marc Court 
of First Instance ordered Neptune’s arrest 
for ordering and participating in the ‘mas-
sacre’ at La Scierie. Although Neptune did 
not receive direct notification, he turned 
himself in after hearing about the order 
on the radio in June 2004. Neptune was 
detained for twenty-five months in two 
Haitian prisons. In April 2007, an appellate 
court held that the order against Neptune 
had been made by a court without jurisdic-
tion. The Haitian constitution stipulates 
that state agents can not be judged by ordi-
nary courts. The matter was directed to the 
High Court of Justice, where it remained 
pending at the time of this decision. Nep-
tune was granted temporary humanitarian 
release in July 2006. 
Haiti asserted that the alleged violations 
occurred prior to the establishment of the 
current government. The Court held that 
difficult conditions did not justify failure 
to comply with obligations of the Conven-
tion. Haiti argued that because of the sepa-
ration of powers, the executive was not 
responsible for the judiciary’s failures. The 
Court, however, asserted the international 
legal principle of unity of the state, holding 
Haiti as a whole responsible for violations, 
regardless of which branch of government 
directly caused them.
The Court found Haiti in violation of 
Neptune’s judicial protections under Arti-
cles 8 and 25 as a result of the unjustifiable 
delay of access to justice, prolongation 
of uncertainty, and lack of judgment by a 
competent judge on the merits. First, the 
Court held that Haiti failed to give Neptune 
sufficient notice of the charges against him 
until September 2005 when he had been 
detained for over a year. Second, the Court 
noted that Haiti had detained Neptune for 
more than two years upon the order of 
a tribunal lacking jurisdiction over him. 
Third, his case was mandated to the High 
Court of Justice which had no operative 
procedures. This resulted in undue delays 
in Neptune’s access to justice. The Court 
held that temporary release without any 
formal documentation rendered Neptune 
vulnerable to re-imprisonment and to repri-
sals from Haitian society. 
The Court also found the state violated 
Neptune’s rights to personal liberty within 
Article 7 and his right to personal integrity 
protected by Article 5. Under Article 7, 
Neptune’s detention was illegal and arbi-
trary because it had been prescribed by a 
court without jurisdiction. Additionally, he 
was not adequately informed of the reasons 
for his detention nor allowed to appear 
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before a judge until 11 months after his 
arrest. The unhygienic cells, restrictions 
on movement, threats from guards and 
other inmates, and the failure to prevent 
escalation of violence resulting in a riot 
that endangered Neptune’s life amounted 
to Article 5 violations. Further, Haitian 
officials held Neptune in the same cells as 
convicted criminals, in direct contraven-
tion of Article 5.
The Court prescribed reparations, 
including $95,000 in costs and damages 
to be paid to Neptune. The Court ordered 
Haiti to expeditiously decide the case 
against Neptune, to set forth rules for the 
High Court enabling it to be operative and 
consistent with the Convention, and to 
improve the conditions of detention facili-
ties in line with international standards.
IACHR Decides First Case on Just 
Compensation 
On May 6, 2008, the Court decided 
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, and ruled that the 
Ecuadorian government had limited the 
Chiribogas’ property rights (Article 21) 
in contravention of the judicial protec-
tions (Articles 8 and 25) provided in the 
American Convention on Human Rights. 
In 1991, the Municipal Council of Quito 
issued a declaration expropriating peti-
tioners’ inherited land for public use as 
the Parque Metropolitano, an area for 
recreation and ecological protection. The 
state possessed the land in 1997, render-
ing the petitioners unable to exercise their 
rights to use and enjoy the property. The 
state made a unilateral determination of 
value contested by petitioners and rebuffed 
by expert assessments. The determination 
consequently gave rise to condemnation 
proceedings that remained pending.  
Ecuador contended that petitioners 
failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The 
Court found that petitioners instituted mul-
tiple actions in Ecuador to establish the 
illegality of the declaration of public utility 
on the basis that they received insufficient 
notice and were subjected to discrimina-
tory treatment in the targeting of their 
land. An excessive amount of time passed 
in which state courts failed to produce 
definite rulings on the petitioners’ claims. 
The Court also noted that the writ of 
amparo, which would have offered peti-
tioners protection from expropriation, had 
been denied. Accordingly, petitioners had 
exhausted domestic remedies.
Article 21 provides that the right to 
property is not absolute and can be lim-
ited for reasons of public utility or social 
interest where the owner is justly compen-
sated and the expropriation is governed 
by law. The Court found that the expro-
priation represented a reasonable limitation 
because it was aimed at environmental 
protection. The state’s unilateral assess-
ment of property value, however, was not 
a just compensation, and the condemnation 
proceedings exceeded a reasonable time 
period and were ineffective. Ecuador’s 
failure to provide the judicial protections 
of notice and effective remedy in relation 
to the deprivation of property constituted a 
violation of Articles 21, 8, and 25.
The judgment prescribed reparations, 
including the provision of just compensa-
tion within six months, with the Court 
reserving the right to award compensation 
and costs if Ecuador was unable to do so 
on its own. 
Panama Responsible for 1970s 
Disappearances
In its August 12, 2008 decision, the 
Court found that the Panamanian govern-
ment violated Heliodoro Portugal and his 
family’s rights to personal liberty, humane 
treatment, fair trial, and judicial protection 
as delineated in the American Convention 
on Human Rights. The Court also found 
that Panama failed to criminalize forced 
disappearance and to fulfill its obliga-
tion to criminalize torture as prescribed 
by the Inter-American Convention on the 
Forced Disappearances of Persons and 
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture, respectively. Portugal, 
a suspected communist intellectual, was 
abducted in 1970 and had remained miss-
ing for 30 years. After Panama’s transition 
to democracy, Portugal’s daughter reported 
the disappearance in 1990. Remains found 
near military barracks in 2000 were deter-
mined to be those of Portugal. 
Panama claimed inadmissibility due 
to failure to exhaust domestic remedies, 
asserting that family members never made 
a direct accusation and that the investiga-
tion had been conducted without delay. 
The Court found that the initiation of a 
direct accusation was not a requirement, 
and given Portugal’s disappearance over 
30 years ago, there had been an unjustified 
delay in the investigation. In response to 
Panama’s assertion that the Court lacked 
temporal jurisdiction, the Court held that 
it would be limited to those violations 
occurring after May 1990 when Panama 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Because Portugal was killed before this 
time, the Court could not rule on the ques-
tion of extrajudicial killing. 
The Court could rule, however, on per-
sonal liberty, because the forced disappear-
ance continued until 2000 when Portugal’s 
remains were identified. The Court denied 
Panama’s argument that the alleged disap-
pearance and ill-treatment ended when Por-
tugal was killed, prior to the recognition of 
jurisdiction. The Court found that Panama 
violated Article 7 from the moment it 
accepted jurisdiction until the moment Por-
tugal’s remains were identified. The Court 
also found Panama violated the Article 5 
right to humane treatment, holding that the 
inactivity of state authorities, lack of effec-
tive investigation, and failure to sanction 
those responsible violated the mental and 
moral integrity of the family members. 
In addition, the Court found Panama in 
violation of procedural rights asserted in 
Articles 8 and 25 and determined that 
domestic recourses were ineffective in 
guaranteeing access to justice, a thorough 
investigation, and the sanctioning of those 
responsible. No investigation occurred in 
the 38 years that Portugal was missing. 
During 18 of these years Panama, as a state 
party to the Convention, was obligated 
to investigate. It was unreasonable for 
Panama to have allowed 18 years to pass 
without investigating. 
Although petitioners alleged violations 
of freedom of thought and expression, the 
Court held that familial access to informa-
tion about what happened to Portugal was 
not within the limits of Article 13. Due 
to the timing of the disappearance, the 
Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on 
the ideological basis for disappearance. In 
addition to material and immaterial dam-
ages, the Court ordered Panama to provide 
free medical and psychological care to 
the family members and to pay litigation 
costs.   HRB
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